University at Albany, State University of New York

Scholars Archive
Financial Analyst

Honors College

Spring 5-2019

Impact of the Global Financial Crisis on Developing and Advanced
Countries' Reserve Holdings
Nora Derian
University at Albany, State University of New York, nderian@albany.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarsarchive.library.albany.edu/honorscollege_finance
Part of the Finance and Financial Management Commons

Recommended Citation
Derian, Nora, "Impact of the Global Financial Crisis on Developing and Advanced Countries' Reserve
Holdings" (2019). Financial Analyst. 12.
https://scholarsarchive.library.albany.edu/honorscollege_finance/12

This Honors Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Honors College at Scholars Archive. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Financial Analyst by an authorized administrator of Scholars Archive. For more
information, please contact scholarsarchive@albany.edu.

Impact of the Global Financial Crisis on
Developing and Advanced Countries’ Reserves Holdings

An honors thesis presented to the
Department of Finance
University at Albany, State University of New York
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for graduation with honors in business
and
graduation from The Honors College

Nora Nectar Derian
Research Advisor: Rita Biswas, Ph.D.

May 2019

Abstract
The reserve holdings held by the central bank of a country, and more importantly, the changes
in those holdings as a percentage of the country’s Gross Domestic Product, can indicate a lot
about the financial health of an economy. In this paper, we examine the cross-sectional
differences between emerging and advanced economies’ reserve holdings as well as their
variations over time, around the global financial crisis of 2008. It is apparent that countries
hold reserves for various reasons, primarily for insurance and to attract future investment, and
that they are more crucial to emerging economies than developed.
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Introduction
Reserves are liquid assets held by a bank, company, or government in order to meet
expected future payments and/or emergency needs (Financial Glossary). Countries hold reserves
in their central banks to control exchange rates – primarily to keep the rates stable, which in turn,
improves a government’s economic environment and protects it from volatile currency movements
(Bedell 2013). Levels of reserves held by a government and changes in those reserves are watched
closely by the entire global business community: by institutional and private investors and traders,
by other governments and by policy makers at home and abroad, to name a few. Why? A country’s
ability to repay foreign debt and thereby the country’s credit rating can be derived from examining
its reserve holdings, more specifically, as a percentage of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The
rate at which countries’ reserves change is monitored closely because it is an imperative indicator
of a country’s currency value, which may lead to speculative attacks 1. Advanced or developed
countries, generally have more stable currencies and hold their reserves in their home currencies
and in a mix of the world’s leading currencies, such as the US Dollar, or the Euro or the Japanese
Yen. Emerging or less developed countries, on the other hand, tend to not hold any significant
proportion of their reserves in their own currencies but in more stable currencies, essentially in the
leading currencies previously mentioned. These emerging economies are often susceptible to the
threat of a speculative attack when the value of the local currency depreciates against the currency
of the reserves.

1

Speculative attack – hot money flowing in and out of currencies, securities, real estate, and commodities. When
speculators believe the value of a currency will depreciate, they begin exchanging the currency for another thereby
furthering the devaluation. Adapted from (Eiteman, Stonehill and Moffett n.d.)
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Economists have been trying to pinpoint an accurate measure of the opportunity cost of
accumulating reserves since research began in this area. Potential costs include per capita income,
because capital is scarcer in developing countries which leads to a higher opportunity cost, net
foreign indebtedness, the government bond yield, and the spread between the government bond
yield and short-term interest rates (De Beautfort Wjinholds and Kapetyn 2001). Economies can
adopt a floating exchange rate which decreases the amount of required reserves (De Beautfort
Wjinholds and Kapetyn 2001). Even with less required reserves, they are still costly to hold,
especially for countries with debt-servicing difficulties. Changes in the international financial
markets can significantly increase the interest rates countries pay on international borrowing
(Landell-Mills 1989).
The rate of reserves held as a percentage of GDP vary according to global economic
conditions such as changes in trade or investments. The global financial crisis began in the United
States and Europe in 2007 and spread to most other economies throughout 2008. Unsustainable
appreciation in real estate markets and overly-accessible credit led to the collapse of the financial
system. Emerging markets were most negatively impacted through the financial channels,
specifically through high-leverage and short-term debt, which was further instigated by pegged
exchange rates (Berkmen, et al. 2012). Thus, the 2008 global financial crisis changed countries’
saving patterns. The objective of this paper is to examine the impact of the Global Financial Crisis
(GFC) on countries’ reserves and to specifically examine if the impact was different on developed
countries versus emerging economies. Using a sample of 46 countries’ annual reserve holdings
during the period 2003 to 2017, and a simple comparative analysis, this paper finds differences
between the two groups of countries.

To further observe the effects of the crisis on reserve

adequacy, this study analyzes reserves held from 2003-2007, 2008-2013, and 2013-2017.
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Separating the overall sample period into these time segments allows for analysis of the pre-crisis
period, crisis period, and post-crisis period. Preliminary results show that there is indeed a
differential impact of the GFC on countries’ reserve holdings: emerging economies saw a
significant drop in their reserves holdings as a percentage of GDP, post-crisis, compared to
advanced countries. The greatest disparities in reserve accumulation are found in the cross-cultural
analyses. Whereas advanced economies’ reserve adequacy stayed constant, or even decreased
following the crisis, emerging economies rapidly increased reserve holdings as a percent of GDP.
The differences are especially noted between both advanced and emerging Asian economies vs the
rest of the continents.

Literature Review and Context:
Why Do Countries Accumulate Reserves?
Countries’ demand for reserves are positively and negatively correlated to certain
economic factors, as described in a World Economic Output report from September 2003. The
positive factors include economic size, current account vulnerability, and capital account
vulnerability. On the other hand, exchange rate flexibility and opportunity cost negatively
correspond (Edison 2003). For example, when exchange rate depreciation is projected to improve
the balance-of-payments, the necessity for international reserves is likely to decrease (Shevchuk
2015). The negative elasticity of the reserve demand was confirmed for 13 industrial countries
(Bahmani-Oskooee and Niroomand 1998). From a dataset using 100 countries’ reserve
accumulations from 1975-2004, the determinants of traditional macro variables, financial
variables, and institutional variables did not hold the same weight of importance among different
countries (Cheung and Ito 2009). The traditional macro variables relate to the factors mentioned
earlier from the World Economic Report that are typically associated with reserve behavior such
3

as imports, volatility of exports, opportunity cost of holding international reserves, and per capita
GDP (Cheung and Ito 2009). The second category includes money supply, external debts and
capital flows (Cheung and Ito 2009). Fear of low reserve holdings leads to speculation and furthers
capital outflows causing an “internal drain” i.e. capital flight by speculators (De Beautfort
Wjinholds and Kapetyn 2001). A spike in capital outflows typically leads to the depreciation of
currency. In that case, monetary authorities can “(1) allow the exchange rate to depreciate, (2) use
foreign reserves to defend the exchange rate, (3) raise the interest rate in the hope that a higher
interest rate will discourage capital outflows, (4) impose capital controls, or (5) use a combination
of all of the above” (Dominguez, Hashimoto and Ito 2012). The third category is institutional
variables which includes corruption, political stability, and capital controls (Cheung and Ito 2009).
Most countries hold their reserves in the form of low-yielding short-term US Treasury
securities. This proposes an opportunity cost for countries with different currencies. It also makes
these emerging economies sensitive to US monetary policy through changing exchange rates
(Davis, Crowley and Morris 2018). The Turkish lira, for example, fell from about 1 lira = 0.67
US Dollars on January 4, 2010 to 1 lira = 0.19 US Dollars on January 2, 2019 (XE Currency
Converter - Live Rates n.d.). The more this value continues to drop, the more expensive it is for
the country to finance its debts. The cost also increases due to investors requiring higher yields
based on the riskiness of lending to countries in crisis. In countries, such as Turkey, which are
synonymous with political corruption, the required level of reserves is even higher. Less corrupt
countries traditionally hold a lower level of international reserves because they do not need to
validate their trustworthiness as much as their more relatively corrupt counterparts do (Aizenman
and Marion 2002) (Davis, Crowley and Morris 2018).

Therefore, the traditional belief is that

developing countries with a high level of exposure to external financing should accumulate a
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strong level of international reserves to protect themselves from financial crises and support the
value of local currencies (Aizenman, Lee and Rhee 2004). Contrastingly, there is an alternative
consideration for capital flows and international reserves. It is argued that emerging market
economies increase reserve holdings to secure foreign direct investments (FDI) from the most
developed countries, specifically the US (Dooley, Folkerts-Landau and Garber 2008). This implies
that the better developing economies perform financially, the more the countries should
accumulate in international reserves.
In the case of Asian economies, many of which are on the IMF list of developing nations,
forex reserves have been soaring since the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998. Out of fear of
unexpected shortages of foreign exchange and currency crisis paired with distrust of the IMF
following the Asian crisis, the nations have been holding above-optimal level reserves (Park and
Estrada 2009). The term “above optimal” refers to the amount suggested by the GuidottiGreenspan rule introduced in 1999 for emerging market economies. It recommends that
developing economies “should have sufficient reserves to cover full amortization for up to one
year without access to foreign credit” (Greenspan 1999). Additionally, numerous Asian countries
participate in extensive trade with other nations. The trade practices make these nations highly
susceptible to external shocks thereby increasing the level of demanded reserves (Shevchuk 2015).
What differentiates the 2008 financial crisis from previous crises is how much it effected
the global economy (unlike the series of crises in Mexico, Asia, Russia, Brazil, etc. in the 1990s).
Those crises arguably did not significantly affect the economy on a universal scale because when
the Mexican crises led to increased reserves in Mexico, East Asian reserves were unchanged and
vice versa (Aizenman and Jaewoo 2007). Yet, after the series of crises, developing economies’
foreign reserves increased overall as a form of self-insurance (Vieia 2017).

5

The global financial crisis began in developed countries towards the end of 2007 and then
spread to emerging economies by mid-late 2008 (Dominguez, Hashimoto and Ito 2012).
Authorities allowed for either their currency value to depreciate or devalue and also allowed their
reserves to deplete when capital outflows suddenly increased during the past crises years (per the
aforementioned monetary policy options). However, data suggests many authorities were obliged
to do both during the global financial crisis (Dominguez, Hashimoto and Ito 2012). The Fed
implemented a system to provide liquidity to the interbank dollar market in response to this crisis.
Furthermore, The Fed created the Term Auction Facility to provide funding to US banks and swap
lines to other central banks (Dominguez, Hashimoto and Ito 2012). The funds obtained through
the swap lines trickled their way down to commercial banks in their respective countries (Fleming
and Klagge 2010). The same study found a positive relationship, though notably, not causation,
between countries that used their reserves during the global financial crisis and faster GDP
recovery (Dominguez, Hashimoto and Ito 2012).
Based on previous literature, it is evident that countries could be forced to lower their
reserves after a crisis due to economic circumstances leading to capital outflows. Contrastingly,
countries also could take a stance to build up reserves as insurance. Since both are possible, this
study empirically tests whether advanced economies handle crises differently than emerging
economies.

Data and Analysis
The International Monetary Fund, IMF from this point forward, collects data and reports
financial metrics on nearly all of its 189 member-countries. The organization has classified lists of
“Advanced Economies” and “Developing Economies”. The graphs and tables in this paper use the
countries that fall under the IMF’s advanced and developing lists. The IMF placed countries in the
6

advanced group if they fit certain characteristics including “relatively high income levels, welldeveloped financial markets, and high degrees of financial intermediation and diversified
economic structures with rapidly growing service sectors” (Nielsen 2013). As another frame of
reference for developed/emerging markets, Morgan Stanley Capital International, referred to as
MSCI from this point forward, categorizes the countries based on openness to foreign ownership,
ease of capital inflows/outflows, efficiency of the operational framework, market organization,
market infrastructure, and stability of institutional framework (Barra 2010).

Overview: Complete Sample Period 2003-2017
The GDP and the reserve holdings of the selected economies from the IMF Advanced
Economies and Developing Economies were extracted from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
and from the World Bank Global Economic Monitor, in US Dollars. In a simple calculation, the
reserve holdings were divided by the GDP of each economy for every year in the data set to arrive
at the reserves held as a percentage of GDP. It is necessary to state that reserve adequacy levels
can be equally influenced by an increase in amount of reserves and/or a decrease in GDP.
However, in this dataset, increases in reserve adequacy as a percentage of GDP were largely
attributable to a higher dollar amount of reserves. This conclusion is apparent when observing the
raw data of GDP for each country compared to the amount, in dollars, of reported reserves.
In Figure 1.1, emerging economies’ reserves/GDP are plotted over the time period 20032017. Reserve adequacy had an average of 19.46% of GDP with an average standard deviation of
11.75% for the series, as depicted in Figure 1.2. The developing countries are separated by
continent to highlight the cross-cultural differences in reserve accumulation behavior. Asia
remains the highest; however we observe that developing European economies start to increase
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reserves following the crisis to nearly Asian-levels. China, Thailand, and Malaysia were among
the highest reserve holders as they have been accumulating above-optimal reserves since the Asian
Financial Crisis, as mentioned in the earlier section. It is worth highlighting the median of the
developing economies and separating reserves by continent because the average is skewed to the
right due to the few countries with extraordinarily high reserve adequacy. It is also worth noting
the African sector only includes South Africa as that was the only African country to be included
on IMF’s developing economies list. Figure 1.2 displays the average vs the median for the sample.
In general, there is a positive trend in reserve accumulation over time.
Figure 2.1 depicts reserves/GDP for developed economies over 2003-2017. Holdings as a
percentage had an average of 7.45% of GDP over the series with a standard deviation of 7.92%.
By separating the developing countries by continent, we observe a significant difference between
Asia (although only made up of Japan as that is the only Asian country on IMF’s list of advanced
nations) and the other continents in reserve behavior. In general, Developed Europe’s reserves fell
over the series and settled around 5% as Developed North America rose from 3% and settled to
about 4%. Asia began at approximately 21% and increased until falling again to the low 20s. The
median is also imperative in this dataset as it reflects the general developing economies’ behavior
more accurately than the average. The median, as depicted in Figure 2.2, sits at 4.53% for the
period at large.
When comparing Figures 1.1 and 2.1, the differences in savings patterns among developing
economies and advanced economies becomes apparent. As expected, reserve proportions for
developed countries are significantly lower than their developing counterparts. To recap, this is
because emerging economies need to prove their ability to repay debts more to attract investment
and to protect the value of the local currency.

8

Based on a paired t-test and a difference of means test, the differences in reserve holdings
as a percentage of GDP for the advanced economies vs emerging economies was confirmed for
the period reviewed.

Reserve Holdings as a % of GDP
Emerging Economies: Separated by Continent
2003-2017

Figure 1.1
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11.10%
10.72%
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Africa

Median
15.46%
14.97%
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15.32%
12.85%
14.67%
13.06%
16.27%
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14.51%
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16.35%
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Figure 2.1

20.84%
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19.46%

10.88%
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Reserve Holding as a % of GDP
Developed Economies: Separated by Continent
2003-2017
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Figure 2.2
Year
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014

North America

Asia

Developed Economies
Mean Holdings
Standard Deviation
10.67%
11.91%
9.98%
11.26%
9.24%
10.45%
9.86%
11.36%
9.37%
11.80%
5.70%
6.21%
6.74%
7.06%
7.06%
7.26%
6.32%
6.17%
6.83%
6.77%
6.44%
6.85%
5.78%
5.71%
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Median
4.53%
3.77
4.56%
3.84%
3.90%
3.54%
4.54%
4.90%
4.33%
4.32%
4.18%
4.15%

2017

2015
2016
2017
Average

5.69%
5.81%
6.24%
7.45%

5.56%
5.02%
5.44%
7.92%

4.57%
5.02%
5.24%
4.53%

The Pre-Crisis Period: 2003-2007
Figure 3.1 demonstrates emerging economies’ reserve adequacy over the time series 20032007, referred to as pre-crisis from this point forward. This pre-crisis time however, followed
shortly after the crises of the 90s. Nearly all participating countries in the highlighted continents
increased their reserve holdings in this time. The median was 12.85% of GDP in 2003 and rose to
15.14% of GDP in 2007. Numerous Asian nations i.e. China, Malaysia, and Thailand, experienced
a currency inflation against the US Dollar in the early 2000s which may have contributed to the
affordability of accumulating reserves in this time. In 2003, $1 USD was the equivalent of 41.48
Thai baht. Four years later, $1 USD had deflated to 34.52 baht (International Monetary Fund). The
increase in reserves strengthened the local currency sparking a cyclical movement of more
affordable reserve accumulation. Figure 3.2 is the developing economies’ reserve adequacy over
Figure 3.1
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the same series. Europe and North American developed countries experienced very little change
over this series. The outlier, Japan, increased reserve adequacy even though the yen experienced
volatility ranging from ¥108.19 to ¥117.75 (International Monetary Fund) following the pattern of
its other Asian counterparts.
Figure 3.2
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The Crisis Period: 2008-2012
The effects of the crisis are immediately recognizable from a macro standpoint as
represented in Figure 4.1. Slightly unexpectedly, the developed markets experienced a greater loss
between 2007-2008 as a result than the emerging markets. This could be due to the fact that the
crisis began in Europe and the United States in 2007 – sparked by extremely accessible credit and
unsustainable property appreciation – and eventually streamed down to emerging economies in
2008. Both developed and emerging Europe observed a decrease by approximately 5% during the
crisis. Emerging Europe was able to recover reserve adequacy in the following year (although
short-lived and partly explained by a drop in GDP) along with developing Asia, as seen in Figure
5.1 (World Bank). The advanced economies remained fairly neutral in holdings until the end of
this time segmented period, represented in Figure 5.2. In terms of exchange rates, the dollar
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appreciated an average of 12.49% against other currencies (primarily developing economy
currencies) between the 2003-2007 and 2008-2012 periods (International Monetary Fund). The
capital flight that took place during the crisis devalued the local currencies of many emerging
economies. The advanced nations (excluding Japan) kept reserves below a maximum of 8% of
GDP even after the crisis whereas emerging countries accumulated and maintained reserves above
11%, although typically much higher (Figure 6.1).

Reserve Holdings as % of GDP
Emerging vs Developed Economies
2003-2017

Figure 4.1
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The Post-Crisis Period: 2013 – 2017
Disparities in reserve adequacy between emerging market continents minimized in the
2013 – 2017 time series. Asia’s reserves decreased as developing Europe’s increased – even
neutralizing in 2016 – as depicted by the graph in Figure 7.1. As the developing economies grew
more similar in behavior, the difference in percentage of holdings was the second largest of the
whole time series between advanced economies and developing (15.19% in 2009 and 15.03% in
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2016) (Figure 4.1). Developed North American and European reserves experienced virtually no
change. Japan continued to hold above-optimal levels even reaching about 28.05% in 2015 (Figure
7.2). This level allowed Japan to surpass the developing Asian economies in holding percentages.

Figure 7.1
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Summary and Conclusions

From the difference in means test and paired T-test, it is evident that the changes in reserve
holdings as a percentage of GDP for emerging economies and developed economies is statistically
significant. This provides insight of the saving behavior of these countries. This study is quite
elementary in terms of data analysis. There is no control factor or other variable factors analyzed
that could affect reserves as a percentage of GDP (such as political turmoil, domestic economic
cycles, etc.). A more detailed approach to analyzing exchange rate variations may also lead to a
better understanding of reserve volatility. However, a wholesome conclusion can be extracted from
this analysis that provides an opportunity for further, more in-depth research.
We observe that the previous research in regard to reserves as a form of insurance is still
applicable to emerging economies post-Global Financial Crisis. It is possible the developed
economies did not behave the same way because they do need the increased insurance. It is
apparent that Asian nations are still excessively accumulating reserves since the Asian crisis of the
90s. The Fed’s post-crisis plan lifted the depressed economies and led the countries to a nearseamless recovery which lowered the requirement for reserve accumulations.

In times of

economic turmoil, emerging economies are still obligated to maintain a high percentage of reserves
whereas developed economies are not – at least they do not behave like they do. Overall, emerging
economies rose holding percentages from 17.25% in 2003 and ended the series at 20.31%
Oppositely, developed economies started at 10.67% in 2003 and fell to 6.24% by 2017. Reserve
holdings as a percentage of GDP remains an imperative indicator to help both understand current
financial conditions and to forecast financial behavior of varying economies.
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